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This is a minor problem, however. It
does not significantly mar an excellent
work that will serve anyone desiring
grounding in strategic studies or a re-
fresher on strategy.
MARK T. CLARK
California State University
San Bernardino, California
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. 448pp.
$27.95
This monumental and ambitious work
sets out to provide the definitive account
of the “offensive realism” school of in-
ternational relations theory. Offensive
realism represents a kind of synthesis of
the classical realism of Hans Morgen-
thau and the structural or “defensive”
realism of Kenneth Waltz. With Mor-
genthau it assumes that states (or major
states) seek to accumulate as much
power as possible for themselves, but it
accepts Waltz’s view that the reason they
do so lies in the structure of the interna-
tional system rather than in the human
lust for power. Mearsheimer must there-
fore show that Waltz and his many fol-
lowers have been overly optimistic in
analyzing the implications for state be-
havior of the anarchic character of the
international system. According to
Mearsheimer, they have wrongly as-
sumed that a cautious or defensive ap-
proach to safeguarding a state’s security
is the only rational approach and hence
the norm for most states. Rather, he in-
sists, aggressive or expansionist behavior
is both more common in the recent his-
tory of the great powers than this would
allow and more rational in the sense that
it is not infrequently very successful.
Mearsheimer’s thesis is richly illustrated,
from the history of the great powers
from the wars of the French Revolution
through the end of the Cold War. It also
looks out into the future to test the the-
ory against the common if vaguely artic-
ulated belief that great-power war has
become obsolete. For these reasons, and
because it is written in a clear and jargon-
free style, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics holds much interest even for
those with limited patience for the theo-
logical disputes of international relations
theorists. At the same time, it is a formi-
dable challenge to mainstream realism.
It scores many points off an approach
that somehow never comes to grips with
what one is tempted to call the sheer
bloody-mindedness of international pol-
itics. Particularly novel and persuasive is
Mearsheimer’s analysis of “buck pass-
ing” (not “bandwagoning”) as the fun-
damental alternative to balancing against
another power.
Yet the book has its limitations, which
are largely the limitations of the realist
school as such. Mearsheimer never quite
convinces when he argues that the do-
mestic regimes and leadership of, for ex-
ample, Britain, the United States, Nazi
Germany, and imperial Japan had no
fundamental impact on their interna-
tional behavior. But perhaps the weakest
part of the book is its disregard of the
ideological context of nineteenth-cen-
tury European diplomacy. The anti-
revolutionary alliance of Austria, Prussia,
and Russia, and the “Concert of Europe,”
were arguably at least as important in
maintaining the long great-power peace
through much of this period as were the
abstract structural characteristics of the
European state system. For that matter,
the fact that many of the wars that did
occur were connected in some way with
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the decay of the Ottoman Empire seems
to suggest, contra Mearsheimer, that
wars can be caused as much by the
weakness as by the strength of a key ac-
tor. Both these points have suggestive
applications as we look to the twenty-
first century. The war against terrorism
might well be the occasion for the for-
mation of a global “concert” of the great
powers. The greatest threat to such a
concert could well be the continuing
weakness of Russia—not, as Mear-
sheimer holds, the rising strength of
China.
CARNES LORD
Naval War College
Kagan, Donald, and Fredrick W. Kagan. While
America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness,
and the Threat to Peace Today. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s, 2000. 483pp. $32.50
Did the leadership of the United States
throw away a priceless opportunity to
bring stability, prosperity, and peace to
the world in the decade following the
end of the Cold War, as surely as the
leadership of Great Britain failed to
grasp a similar opportunity following the
end of the First World War? For Donald
and Fredrick Kagan, the answer is a re-
sounding yes. While America Sleeps is
their attempt not only to show how op-
portunities were squandered but also to
highlight the similarities of both situa-
tions. The Kagans argue that both
states dangerously reduced the size of
their military forces, falsely believed in
the saving power of technology,
failed to exercise strategic leader-
ship, and embarked on a pattern of
“pseudo-engagement.” The impor-
tance of the central question and the
authors’ credentials make this a book to
be taken seriously.
The Kagans, both historians of note,
make a potent father-and-son team.
Donald Kagan, the Hillhouse Professor
of History and Classics at Yale Univer-
sity, has produced an impressive body of
work, including the best-selling A His-
tory of Warfare. Fredrick W. Kagan, cur-
rently a professor of military history at
West Point, is perhaps less well known
to the general public but has impressive
credentials in his own right.
While America Sleeps is divided into
three sections. The first, “Britain be-
tween the Wars,” chronicles that state’s
transition from a globally dominant
power in 1918 to one of near-fatal
weakness by the mid-1930s. It pays spe-
cial attention to the Chanak crisis of
1922, the Corfu affair of 1923, the
Locarno Treaty of 1925, the Italian-
Ethiopian War of 1934–35, and the re-
militarization of the Rhineland in 1936.
The second, “The United States after
the Cold War,” follows a generally simi-
lar approach, addressing particularly
the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the
U.S. intervention in Somalia from 1991
to 1993, the occupation of Haiti in
1994, the Clinton administration’s at-
tempts to deal with North Korea’s nu-
clear weapons program, that same
administration’s efforts to curtail Iraqi
production of weapons of mass de-
struction, and American responses to
conflict in the Balkans. The true third
section, although actually included in
the second section of the book, is the
concluding chapter, in which the au-
thors clearly state their belief that the
United States is at risk of “suffering a
fate similar to that which befell Britain
in the 1930s.” They present an argu-
ment supporting this conclusion and
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